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1 Introduction
Macroeconomics is considered the study of the economy as a whole and attempts to
explain the behavior of aggregate statistics. Since the study of macroeconomics be-
gan, extensive research has been conducted to find stable relationships among several
aggregate statistics on the assumptions that idiosyncratic changes in an economy, and
agents’ adaptation to the changes, do not influence the behavior of aggregate statis-
tics. It is hoped that once a stable structure of the economy is found, governments
may be able to control their economies using fiscal or monetary policy.
Hayek (1945) is known to be an opponent of central planning based on statisti-
cal information. He emphasizes the economic importance of “the knowledge of the
particular circumstances of time and place”:
“If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adapta-
tion to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to
follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with
these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources
immediately available to meet them.”
Kirzner (1973) calls the agents who adapt to idiosyncratic changes entrepreneurs, and
argues that the absence of entrepreneurs in the neoclassical framework means that
important aspects of the real economy are missed.
In this paper, I aim to model entrepreneurship, defined as firms’ activities to
predict and adapt to idiosyncratic changes in consumers’ taste, in a general equi-
librium model. I examine how the consideration of entrepreneurship changes the
consequences of expansionary fiscal policy. I argue that the absence of entrepreneur-
ship in macroeconomics makes researchers overrate the effectiveness of expansionary
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fiscal policy.
More specifically, I extend Startz’s (1989) model and include idiosyncratic taste
shocks, to which firms must adapt. In Startz’s model, large government expenditure
partially crowds out private consumption, but increases real GDP. The existence of
partial crowding out generates a trade off between private consumption and govern-
ment expenditure. In this paper, I show that expansionary fiscal policy can lower
real GDP because the existence of entrepreneurship makes it difficult for government
expenditure to substitute for private consumption.
The logic is explained as follows. When consumers’ tastes alter, private demand
shifts to reflect the changes. However, as the government is not aware of the changes
due to a lack of local information, a welfare-maximizing government cannot change
its demand. Hence, firms that provide goods for consumers must adapt to changes
in demand by processing local information, but firms that provide goods to the gov-
ernment do not have to adapt. It is shown that firms’ aggressive adaptation makes
markets more competitive, causing the aggregate price for private consumption to
drop. Hence, when government expenditure partially crowds out private consump-
tion, expansionary fiscal policy forces people to consume relatively expensive goods.
Thus, expansionary fiscal policy can lower real GDP when there is entrepreneurship.
It is shown that the multiplier of expansionary fiscal policy is a decreasing function
of the level of idiosyncratic risk, the substitutability of goods and the firms’ ability to
predict the changes in consumer tastes. Hence, the multiplier is likely to be negative
if these three factors are large. A rise in idiosyncratic risk increases the importance
of prediction, whereas a rise in the substitutability of goods makes demand more
sensitive to changes in tastes. Hence, both increase the benefits from adapting to
changes by processing local information. On the other hand, an increase in firms’
prediction abilities allows firms to correctly adapt to changes. Thus, a rise in all
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three factors increases the beneficial effects of private consumption on real GDP and
makes it more difficult for government expenditure to substitute for it.
In addition, in this paper I investigate how fiscal policy influences firms’ invest-
ments in prediction ability. It is shown that expansionary fiscal policy lowers in-
vestment in the short run, but does not influence it in the long run. In the short
run, expansionary fiscal policy crowds out private consumption, which reduces the
benefits from investment in prediction ability. However, as firms’ profits are kept
to zero in the long run due to entries and exits, a reduction in demand does not
change the benefits from investment in the long run. Hence, expansionary fiscal
policy does not influence investment. It is shown that two demand-side factors–the
level of idiosyncratic risk and the substitutability of goods–are the most important
determinants of the level of prediction ability in the long run.
Although this paper was stimulated by ideas in Hayek (1945) and Kirzner (1973), I
do not attempt to formulate the theories of these economists. As their arguments are
based on disequilibrium analysis, it is impossible to integrate them into an equilibrium
model. However, as Rosen (1997) argues, I believe that there are gains from trade
between Austrian and neoclassical economics. In this paper, therefore, I attempt
to focus on the aspects of Hayek’s and Kirzner’s arguments that can be expressed in
an equilibrium model in order to address a neglected issue in the literature of fiscal
policy1 .
This approach deserves more attention as recent micro evidence suggests that the
adaptation to idiosyncratic shocks has significant economic impacts. Davis and Halti-
wanger (1999) review the literature and insist that unobserved idiosyncratic factors
play a dominant role in explaining the redistribution of workers. Hubbard (2003)
finds that advanced on-board computers significantly increase capacity utilization in
1Interesting recent reviews of literature related to fiscal policy can be found in Chari and Kehoe
(1999), Auerbach (2002), and Bénassy (2002).
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the trucking industry by improving dispatchers’ ability to make resource-allocation
decisions. The evidence suggests that the investigation of entrepreneurship is an
important neglected area in macroeconomics.
A similar role for entrepreneurs was previously examined in a general equilibrium
framework by Holmes and Schmitz (1990) and Takii (2003c)2. Holmes and Schmitz
(1990) emphasize the importance of the division of labor between entrepreneurs and
managers. Takii (2003c) investigates the effect of entrepreneurship on the total
factor productivity in an economy. However, no paper examines a trade-off between
entrepreneurship and expansionary fiscal policy.
This paper is organized as follows. In the following section, I set up the model.
In Section 3, I analyze the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on real GDP. It is
shown that the effect could be negative. In Section 4, I identify the factors that
influence the magnitude of the multiplier of expansionary fiscal policy. In Section 5,
I investigate the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on firms’ investments in prediction
ability. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
This section sets up the model that enables me to analyze the effect of entrepreneur-
ship on the multiplier of expansionary fiscal policy. The model is based on Startz
(1989). I add idiosyncratic taste shocks, to which firms must adapt, to a slightly
modified version of Startz’s model (1989). This modeling strategy is undertaken to
clarify how the consideration of entrepreneurship changes the results in the previous
literature.
2The different roles of entrepreneurs are incorporated into equilibrium analysis by Kihlstrom and
Laffont (1979) with respect to risk bearing, by Schmitz (1989) with respect to imitation, and by
Aghion and Howitt (1992) with respect to innovation.
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Household: There are identical representative households in an economy, and total
population is normalized to be one. It is assumed that the households’ utilities
depend on a bundle of goods purchased by the household, ci ( C goods ), a bundle
of goods provided by the government, gi (G goods ), and leisure L:
U = θ logC + ξ logG+ (1− θ − ξ) logL,
where C =
"R nc zicαi di
n1−αc
# 1
α
,
G =
"R ng zigαi di
n1−αg
# 1
α
,
α = 1− 1
ρ
∈ (0, 1) .
The parameters θ and ξ are assumed to be between zero and one. They measure
the relative weights that agents place on C goods and G goods, respectively. The
parameter ρ is the measure of the elasticity of substitution. As α is assumed to be
between zero and one, ρ is greater than 1. This means that the goods are imperfect
substitutes. The variables nc and ng measure the varieties of C goods and G goods,
respectively. The denominators, n1−αc or n
1−α
g , are included in each subutility in
order to eliminate the positive taste for variety, as assumed in Startz (1989). The
random variables, zi, represent changes in tastes for each good and are identically
and independently distributed (i.i.d). The incorporation of zi in subutility is the
main departure from Startz’s (1989) model.
Representative households maximize their utility functions by choosing ci and L
subject to the budget constraint:
Z nc
pcicidi = Π+ (N − L)− T,
where pci is the price of the ith C good, Π is capital income, N is the total amount
of available labor in this household, and T is lump sum taxes. The wage rate is
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assumed to be 1. Hence, N − L represents labor income.
Demand functions for C goods and leisure are easily derived, as follows:
ci =
Ã
zi
pci
! 1
1−α
P
α
1−α
c
"
θ
1− ξ
Π+N − T
nc
#
, ∀i, (1)
L =
1− θ − ξ
1− ξ [Π+N − T ] , (2)
where Pc =


R nc p αα−1ci z 11−αi di
nc


α−1
α
.
θ
1−ξ [Π+N − T ] and
1−θ−ξ
1−ξ [Π+N − T ] are the amounts of expenditure allocated
to the purchases of C goods and leisure, respectively. Because of the log linear
specification of the utility function, the allocated expenditure is independent of the
price index, Pc. This simplifies the analysis below. Note that the demand functions
depend on the realization of the random variables, zi. Hence, a firm must adapt to
the changes in tastes when production takes place.
Government: A government purchases G goods and transfers them to households.
Following Startz (1989), it is assumed that re-trading G goods is prohibited. The
government is assumed to maximize the expected value of logG subject to its budget
constraint:
max
gi
Z 
log
ÃR ng zigαi di
n1−αg
! 1
α

 qz (zi) dzi,
s.t. T =
Z ng
pgigidi,
where pgi is the price of the ith G good and qz (zi) is a marginal density function
of zi. Without loss of generality, the distribution function of zi is assumed to be
continuous. The main difference between the households’ decisions and the govern-
ment’s decisions is that the government cannot observe changes in tastes due to the
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lack of local information. As the attention of a human being is limited, it is im-
possible for a decision-maker to observe all information on shifting consumer tastes
for individual goods. Hence, the government must maximize the expected value of
households’ utility. Of course, in reality, politicians would seek to satisfy their own
interests. However, my assumption of a benevolent government assists in identifying
the problems caused by the lack of local information.
As zi has an i.i.d. distribution and gi must be independently chosen due to the
lack of information,
R ng zigαi di = R ng zegαi di, where ze = R ziqz (zi) dzi. Hence, there
is no random component for this maximization problem. The following demand
function is easily derived:
gi =
Ã
ze
pgi
! 1
1−α
P
α
1−α
g
Ã
T
ng
!
, ∀i, (3)
where Pg =


R ng (pgi) αα−1 (ze) 11−α di
ng


α−1
α
.
Note that the demand for G goods does not have any random components. As the
government guarantees the amount of demand, firms do not need to adapt to changes
in demand.
C-goods firm: Each variety of C goods and G goods is produced by a single firm.
A C-goods firm must make two decisions: it must choose how much it produces, and
what the price of its product is. The timing of decisions is as follows. (1) A taste
shock, zi, occurs. (2) A firm, i, observes a noisy signal, si, and infers the realized zi.
(3) The firm produces non-storable goods, ci. (4) The firm discovers what the true
zi is. (5) The firm sets its price, pci.
Let us first consider how the firms set their prices. As it is assumed that goods
cannot be stored, the optimal strategy is for the firms to set the highest possible price
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Figure 1: The Pricing Decision (the picture shows that the highest possible price
the firm can set when the firm has already produced cs is determined by the inverse
demand curve.)
at which they can sell all the products they have already produced3. Assume that
firms know the households’ demand function and that they have already produced
csi units of the goods. The optimal price for the firm i is derived from the inverse
demand function, which is depicted by Figure 1:
pci = zi (c
s
i )
α−1 Pαc
"
θ
1− ξ
Π+N − T
nc
#1−α
.
Note that given this price, pci, the demand for the good always equals the supply of
the good: ci = csi . Hence, I use ci to denote the amount of supplied goods as well.
When the firmmakes its production decision, it must predict the changes in tastes.
It knows that the price will be set on the inverse demand function no matter what
3When α ∈ (0, 1) in the utility function of consumers, it is not optimal for the firm to throw the
product away in order to keep the price high.
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the realization is. Hence, the firm’s problem is specified by the following equation.
π (si) = max
ci
½
Eh [pci|si] ci − ci
A
¾
(4)
s.t. pci = zic
α−1
i P
α
c
"
θ
1− ξ
Π+N − T
nc
#1−α
where Eh [pci|si] =
Z
pciq
h
z/s (zi|si) dzi,
qhz/s (zi|si) =
qhs/z (si|zi) qz (zi)R
qhs/z (si|zi) qz (zi) dzi
and A measures the productivity of the firm and qhs/z (si|zi) is a conditional density
function of si given the realization of zi. The last equation shows that qhz/s (zi|si) is
a posterior density of zi having observed si.
Note that qhs/z (si|zi) depends on h, which measures the firms’ ability to predict
the changes in households’ tastes. If the firm can accurately predict the realization
of zi, the firm has a likelihood function endowed with high h and is considered to
have precise knowledge about the nature of shifting tastes for a particular good. As
the knowledge makes it possible for the firms to adequately adapt to the changes, the
parameter, h, can be interpreted as the index of firms’ entrepreneurial ability. The
ordering of h is mathematically defined later.
The solution to the profit-maximization problem reveals that the price has to be
equal to a constant markup, 1α , times marginal cost,
1
A
, on average:
p (zi, si) ≡ pci =
zi
αAEh (zi|si) , (5)
where Eh (zi|si) = R ziqhz/s (zi|si) dzi. Note that the actual price deviates from the
constant mark-up rule due to firms’ misunderstanding the changes in tastes, zi
Eh(zi|si) .
When the firm discovers the true zi, it realizes that zi differs from the predicted value.
If the realized zi is greater than the predicted one, Eh (zi|si), then the firms can set a
higher price than the mark-up rule. If zi is lower than Eh (zi|si), then the firm must
set a lower price. Hence, zi
Eh(zi|si) can be interpreted as the measure of “a wonderful
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surprise”4.
G-goods firm: G-goods firms have the same technology as C-goods firms, but the
demand for goods is guaranteed by the government. Hence, when the firms decide
how much they produce, the prices of the goods are automatically determined from
the government’s inverse demand function. The G-goods firms’ problem is written
as:
πgi = max
gi
½
pgigi −
gi
A
¾
, (6)
s.t. pgi = z
egα−1i P
α
g
Ã
T
ng
!1−α
.
As there is no random variable on the inverse demand function, there is nothing to
predict. Hence, the price is set at exactly the markup, 1α , times marginal cost
1
A
:
pgi =
1
αA
. (7)
Capital-Market Clearing Condition: It is assumed that a capital market is
perfectly competitive and that entrepreneurs can hedge their own risk. Hence, the
following capital-market clearing condition must be satisfied:
Π = nc
·Z
π (si) qhs (si) dsi − F (h)
¸
+ ng [πg − Fg] , (8)
4Kirzner (1997) points out that entrepreneurs correct their decisions during the equilibrative
market process because the decision-makers discover their earlier errors. Thus, discovery is always
accompanied by a sense of “surprise”. Of course, his emphasis is on “ unthought-of knowledge”,
which differs from the “known ignorance” in this paper. However, I believe that a careful exami-
nation of entrepreneurial discovery based on “known ignorance” clarifies the benefits and the limits
of the neoclassical framework, which is part of the purpose of this paper.
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where qhs (si) =
R
qhs/z (si|zi) qz (zi) dzi, and F (h) and Fg are fixed costs for the pro-
duction of C goods and G goods, respectively.
Fixed cost can be interpreted as the cost of employing management groups and
analysts, the importance of which is emphasized by Chandler (1990). The fixed
costs, F (h) and Fg, may differ as C-goods firms must employ professional analysts
in order to predict the changes in tastes. Hence, the natural assumption would be
F (h) ≥ Fg.
Equilibrium: The market equilibrium in the short run is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 The market equilibrium in the short run is {c (·) , L, gi, p (·, ·) , pg,π (·) ,πg,Π},
which satisfies the following conditions:
1. Households maximize their utility: equations (1) and (2).
2. A government maximizes households’ expected utility: equation (3 ).
3. C-goods firms and G-goods firms maximize their own profits: equations (4), (5),
(6) and (7).
4. The capital market is cleared: equation (8).
The labor market clearing condition is omitted from the definition of the market
equilibrium because of Walras’s law. The market equilibrium in the short run is
defined with a given nc and ng. The zero profit conditions that determine nc and ng
will be introduced later to define the market equilibrium in the long run.
The Expected Revenue in the Equilibrium: Substituting the profit-maximizing
prices of the C-goods firm and the G-goods firm into the demand functions, the
12
expected revenues of the firms are derived as follows:
Eh [p (zi, si) c (si)] = [z (h)]
1
1−α (αA)
α
1−α P
α
1−α
c
θ
1− ξ
Π+N − T
nc
, (9)
pgg = [z
e]
1
1−α (αA)
α
1−α P
α
1−α
g
T
ng
, (10)
where z (h) = Eh
h
Eh [zi|si]
1
1−α
i1−α
,
andEh [p (zi, si) c (si)] =
R
p (zi, si) c (si) q
h
s/z (si|zi) qz (zi) dzidsi andEh
h
Eh [zi|si]
1
1−α
i
=R hR
ziq
h
z/s (zi|si) dzi
i 1
1−α qhs (si) dsi.
The structure of the expected revenue between the C-goods firm and that of the
G-goods firm is similar. The main difference is that the expected revenue of the
C-goods firm is affected by h through z (h) , whereas that of the G-goods firm is
not. It is shown below that z (h) is an increasing function of h. This means that
if entrepreneurs have greater ability to predict changes in tastes, they can expect
to obtain more revenue. Talented entrepreneurs produce more when they can set
high prices, and produce less when they must set low prices. Hence, the correlation
between the price and output is high. That is why they expect to receive a high
revenue. To formally prove this intuition, we need the following assumption.
Assumption: Assume that h is ordered by the informativeness, in the sense of Black-
well (1953). That is, h1 ≥ h2 if and only if there exists a nonnegative function
φ (s2i |s1i ), which satisfies the following three relations:Z
φ
³
s2i |s1i
´
ds2i = 1, a.e. ∀s1i ,Z
φ
³
s2i |s1i
´
qh
1
s/z
³
s1i |zi
´
ds1i = q
h2
s/z
³
s2i |zi
´
, a.e. ∀zi,∀s2iZ
φ
³
s2i |s1i
´
ds1i ∈ (0,∞) , a.e. ∀s2i .
Blackwell (1953) proves that if h is ordered by this criterion, information struc-
ture h1 brings higher ex-ante utility than information structure h2 for any utility
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function. Using Blackwell’s (1953) definition of informativeness, it is shown that
z (h) is increasing in h.
Lemma 2 If h is ordered by the informativeness in the sense of Blackwell (1953),
then z (h) is increasing in h and z (h) ≥ ze for any h.
Proof. As Eh [zi|si]
1
1−α is convex in Eh [zi|si] and Eh [zi|si] is convex in qhz/s (zi|si),
Eh [zi|si]
1
1−α is convex in qhz/s (zi|si). From Theorem 2 in DeGroot (1970, p.436), the
result is immediate.
Using the above lemma, the expected revenue of the C-goods firm is increasing
in h. However, consumers allocate a constant amount of expenditure to C goods,
θ
1−ξ [Π+N − T ]. Hence, the expenditure on C goods is independent of h. As the
expenditure must be equal to the total expected revenue of the C-goods sector in
equilibrium, the price must be adjusted. That is, the firms’ aggressive adaptation to
the changes in tastes would raise competition in the market, and, therefore, the price
index of C goods would drop. It is shown that Pc and Pg are decreasing in z (h) and
ze, respectively:
Pc =
1
αAz (h)
1
α
,
Pg =
1
αA (ze)
1
α
.
The equations show that the price index for C goods is lower than the price index
for G goods. Because of high competition in the C-goods market, the price index of
C goods is lower than that for G goods.
Substituting the price indexes into equations (9) and (10), the expected revenue
in the equilibrium is independent of h:
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Eh [p (zi, si) c (si)] =
θ
(1−ξ) (Π+N − T )
nc
,
pgg =
T
ng
.
The equation shows that the expected revenues of C-goods and G-goods firms in the
equilibrium are equivalent to the expenditure allocated to those goods per firm. As
the total expenditure on C goods is independent of h, the expected revenue is also
independent of h in the equilibrium. The benefits of strong prediction ability are
always cancelled out by a rise in competition.
Of course, if the utility function is not log linear in C, G, and L, the total ex-
penditure on C goods is affected by the relative price of C goods and G goods. A
reduction in Pc raises the total expenditure on C goods and the expected revenue
in the equilibrium. The log linear specification eliminates this additional effect and
makes my analysis simpler.
3 The Multiplier and Prediction Ability
In this section, the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on real GDP is examined.
In particular, I am interested in how firms’ ability to predict the changes in tastes
affects the multiplier of government expenditure. It is shown that the multiplier can
be negative.
Real GDP: Real GDP consists of real private consumption and real government
expenditure:
Y ≡ ncE
h [p (zi, si) c (si)]
Pc
+
ngpgg
Pg
,
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=θ
(1−ξ) (Π+N − T )
Pc
+
T
Pg
,
= C +G.
The above equation shows that the definition of real GDP equals the sum of subutility
from C goods and G goods. Note that as ngpgg
Pg
= G, G is equivalent to real govern-
ment expenditure. Although G is treated as endogenous in this paper, as G = T
Pg
,
and Pg and T are exogenous, G can be also considered as a policy instrument5.
Hence, there are two possible policy instruments: real government expenditure, G,
or nominal government expenditure, T . Following Startz (1989), G is chosen to be a
suitable policy instrument. The choice of policy instrument does not affect the main
arguments below.
Wealth Effect:6 Because monopoly prices exceed marginal costs, an increase in
government expenditure raises aggregate profits:
Π =
(1− α) θN − (1− ξ) (ncF (h) + ngFg) + (1−ξ−θ)(1−α)
αA(ze)
1
α
G
1− ξ − (1− α) θ .
Using this equation, after-tax wealth, Π+N − T , is solved as a function of G:
Π+N − T =
(1− ξ)
·
N − G
A(ze)
1
α
− (ncF (h) + ngFg)
¸
1− ξ − (1− α) θ .
5If G is chosen to be a policy instrument, T must be considered as an endogenous variable. This
means that the government is assumed to minimize T , provided that it guarantees the subutility G
to representative consumers. The solution is the same.
6The wealth effect that operates through an increase in profits is considered the reason for the
Keynesian multiplier effect [ex. Silvestre (1989)]. Unayama, Otaki, and Saito (2000) and Bénassy
(2002) point out that, in fact, the real reason for output expansion in response to expansionary
fiscal policy is the negative wealth effect: as a rise in tax reduces agents’ wealth, agents consume
leisure less and work more. The argument in this paper does not depend on the reason for GDP
expansion.
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The equation shows that an increase in government expenditure lowers after-tax
wealth. Hence, it lowers private consumption. This brings about a trade off between
government expenditure, G, and private consumption, C.
Fiscal Policy: Substituting the derived after-tax wealth into the definition of real
GDP, real GDP in the short run is shown to be a function of government expenditure.
Proposition 3 Real GDP in the short run, Y S, can be expressed as a function of
real government expenditure, G:
Y S = is +msG,
where ms =
(1− ξ − θ) + αθ
µ
1−
³
z(h)
ze
´ 1
α
¶
1− ξ − (1− α) θ ,
is =
αAθ [N − (ncF (h) + ngFg)]
[1− ξ − (1− α) θ] z (h)
1
α .
If z (h) = ze, which can be interpreted as the case of no entrepreneurial activity,
then the result is the same as Startz (1989) and ms is always positive. However,
if z (h) > ze, ms can be negative. That is, if there are entrepreneurial activities,
large government expenditure can lower real GDP. Note that if z (h) > ze, then
Pc < Pg. As large government expenditure partially crowds out private consumption,
households must spend more on relatively expensive goods. Hence, large government
expenditure can lower real GDP.
Note that because z0 (h) > 0, an improvement in the firms’ ability to predict the
changes in tastes lowers the multiplier. That is, active entrepreneurial activities can
weaken the effect of expansionary fiscal policy.
Now, let us consider the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy in the long
run. In the long run, firms enter the market as long as expected profits are positive.
Expected profits are zero in the long-run equilibrium:
Eh [π (si)] = F (h) ,
17
πg = Fg,
where Eh [π (si)] =
R
π (si) qhs (si) dsi. Substituting the zero profit conditions into
equation (8), Π = 0. Using this result, real GDP in the long run is derived from the
definition of real GDP.
Proposition 4 Real GDP in the long run, Y L, can be expressed as a function of real
government expenditure, G:
Y L = il +mlG,
where ml =
1− ξ − θ
³
z(h)
ze
´ 1
α
1− ξ ,
il =
θNαAz (h)
1
α
(1− ξ) .
The results are qualitatively the same as those for the short run: if there is no
entrepreneurial activity (z (h) = ze), thenml is positive, as in Startz (1989), whereas if
entrepreneurial activities are present (z (h) > ze), thenml can be negative. However,
the magnitude of the multiplier is different between the long run and the short run:
ml −ms = −
θ (1− α) (1− ξ − θ)
[1− ξ − (1− α) θ] (1− ξ)
Ã
z (h)
ze
! 1
α
< 0.
This result also appeared in Startz (1989). However, there are two new obser-
vations. First, the difference is larger when z (h) is larger. That is, when firms
have a strong ability to predict changes in tastes, the multiplier in the long run is
substantially lower than that in the short run. Second, as ml can be negative, it is
possible that even when expansionary fiscal policy raises real GDP in the short run,
it can be the source of long-run stagnation.
18
4 Idiosyncratic Risk and Substitutability
In this section, I make a further assumption on the information structure in order
to identify the conditions that influence the multiplier of expansionary fiscal policy.
It is shown that the level of idiosyncratic risk, the substitutability of goods, and the
prediction ability are the key parameters influencing the multiplier.
I assume that log zi comprises a predictable component µ and an unpredictable
component ui:
log z = µ+ ui
where ui is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of σ2u. It is assumed
that the unpredictable component ui summarizes unexpected changes in tastes. The
firms cannot observe ui before making production decisions, but they can observe the
signal si:
si = ui + εi
where εi is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance of σ2ε (h). Note
that the variance of the noise term differs when the firms’ prediction ability differs.
The following measure to capture the firms’ ability to predict the change in con-
sumer tastes, ui, is suggested by Takii (2003a).
Definition 5 The measure of the firms’ ability to predict changes in tastes, u, (the
firms’ prediction ability), is defined by:
h = 1−
R
V ar (u|s) qhs (s) ds
σ2u
,
where V ar (u|s) = R ³u− R uqhz (z|s) dz´2 qhz (z|s) dz and u = log z − µ.
This measure implies that the firms accurately predict u when on average they
reduce the conditional variance, having observed si. To compare ability in different
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environments,
R
V ar (u|s) qhs (s) ds is divided by σ2u, which is the unconditional vari-
ance of ui. The measure h ranges from 0 to 1. If the firms perfectly predict the
changes, h = 1, whereas if the firms do not predict the changes at all, h = 0.
Using the definition of h, the variance of the noise term is endogenously determined
as follows:
σ2ε (h) =
(1− h)σ2u
h
. (11)
As expected, when the firms more accurately predict unexpected changes, the variance
of the noise term is smaller. When h = 1, the variance is 0, whereas when h = 0,
the variance is infinite.
Given this definition, it is shown that:
z (h) = ze exp
(ρ− 1)σ2uh
2
, (12)
where ρ = 1
1−α . The equation shows that the marginal value of prediction ability
is larger if risk is large and goods are more substitutable. If goods are more substi-
tutable, demand is more sensitive to the changes in tastes, from equation (1). Hence,
it is more important for the firms to predict the changes.
Substituting equation (12) into the definitions of ms andml , the following propo-
sition is derived.
Proposition 6 Both the multipliers in the short run and long run are decreasing
in the level of idiosyncratic risk, σ2u, the substitutability of goods, ρ and the firms’
prediction ability h:
ms =
1− ξ − θ −
³
1− 1ρ
´
θ
³
exp ρσ
2
uh
2
− 1
´
1− ξ − θρ
, (13)
ml =
1− ξ − θ exp ρσ2uh
2
1− ξ . (14)
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Note that because the multipliers are decreasing in risk, the substitutability of
goods and the firms’ prediction ability, the multipliers are likely to be negative if
the three factors are large. A rise in idiosyncratic risk increases the importance of
prediction, and a rise in the substitutability of goods makes demand more sensitive
to changes in tastes. Hence, both increase the benefits from adapting to changes
by processing local information. On the other hand, an increase in firms’ prediction
abilities allows firms to correctly adapt to changes. Thus, a rise in all three factors
increases the beneficial effects of private consumption on real GDP and makes it more
difficult for government expenditure to substitute for it.
5 Investment in Prediction Ability
An increase in government expenditure may have a further detrimental effect on the
economy: it may discourage investment in prediction ability. This section asks a
different question than the previous section did, focusing on how expansionary fiscal
policy affects firms’ investment in prediction ability.
Suppose that C-goods firms can invest in their management staff and choose the
level of prediction ability before starting their businesses.
max
h
Eh [π (si)]− F (h) ,
Eh [π (si)] =
h³
1− 1ρ
´
A
iρ−1
P ρ−1c
θ
1−ξ
Π+N−T
nc
ρ
(ze)ρ exp
ρ (ρ− 1)σ2uh
2
.
Assume that the convexity of the F function is strong enough to satisfy the second
order condition. That is, F 00 (h) >
h
ρ(ρ−1)σ2u
2
i2
Eh (π (si)) for any Eh (π (si)) in the
equilibrium. Moreover, it is assumed that F 0 (0) < ρ(ρ−1)σ
2
u
2
E0 (π (si)) and F 0 (1) >
ρ(ρ−1)σ2u
2
E1 (π (si)). These two conditions guarantee that the solution is interior in
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[0, 1]. Hence, the optimal h satisfies:
F 0 (h) =
ρ (ρ− 1)σ2u
2
Eh (π (si)) .
The firms’ investment in prediction ability can be analyzed by examining Eh (π (si))
in the short run and in the long run.
Prediction ability in the short run: In the short run, the number of firms does
not change and profits are positive. Hence, the expected profits depend on the
demand for C goods:
F 0 (h) =
(ρ− 1)σ2u
2
θ (Π+N − T )
nc (1− ξ)
,
θ (Π+N − T )
(1− ξ) =
θ
"
N − G
A(ze)
ρ
ρ−1
− (F (h)nc + Fgng)
#
1− ξ − θρ
.
Applying the implicit function theorem to the first order condition, h is derived as a
function of G, σ2u and ρ in the short run:
Proposition 7 Prediction ability in the short run, hs, is decreasing in G and in-
creasing in σ2u:
hs ≡ Hs
³
G,σ2u, ρ
´
,HsG
³
G,σ2u, ρ
´
< 0,Hsσ
³
G,σ2u, ρ
´
> 0.
The proposition shows that large government expenditure discourages investment
in prediction ability whereas large idiosyncratic risk requires prediction ability. Be-
cause of the crowding- out effect, private demand is lower when the government
spends more. This lowers the firms’ incentives to invest in prediction ability. Strong
uncertainty about taste shocks requires that firms have more ability to predict taste
changes. This increases the firms’ incentives to invest in h.
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The effect of substitutability of goods is ambiguous. On the one hand, the more
substitutable goods are, the more sensitive demand is to changes in tastes. Hence,
the substitutability of goods increases the importance of prediction ability. On the
other hand, however, strong substitutability of goods reduces the monopoly rents of
firms and, therefore, reduces the expected profits of the firms in the equilibrium. This
effect discourages firms from investing in prediction ability. However, the following
corollary shows that the first effect dominates the second effect in my model, if the
expected taste shocks are normalized to be 1.
Corollary 8 Prediction ability in the short run, hs, is increasing in ρ if ze = 1:
If ze = 1, Hsρ
³
G,σ2u, ρ
´
> 0.
Note that proposition 6 shows that the multiplier is decreasing in firms’ prediction
ability. Hence, the results in proposition 7 and corollary 8 reinforce the results in
proposition 6: an increase in risk and substitutability of goods reduces the economic
effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy.
Prediction ability in the long run: Eventually, entries and exits occur and
Eh (π (si)) = F (h) is satisfied in the long run:
F 0 (h) =
ρ (ρ− 1)σ2u
2
F (h) .
This means that changes in demand cannot affect the investment decisions in the
long run. The implicit function theorem proves that h is increasing in σ2u and ρ in
the long run.
Proposition 9 Firms’ prediction ability in the long run, hl, is increasing in σ2u and
ρ:
hl ≡ H l
³
σ2u, ρ
´
,H lσ
³
σ2u, ρ
´
> 0, H lρ
³
σ2u, ρ
´
> 0.
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Note that government expenditure does not influence firms’ prediction ability in
the long run. The only important variables that influence prediction ability from the
demand side are the level of idiosyncratic risk and the substitutability of goods.
Evidence that risk requires prediction ability is found by Takii (2003a, 2003b) in
different contexts. Although there is no evidence about the substitutability of goods
and prediction ability, casual observations indicate that prediction ability is highly
demanded in financial markets, in which, I believe, goods are greatly substitutable.
6 Conclusion
This paper reexamines the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy in the presence of
entrepreneurship. It is shown that the budget-balancing multiplier can be negative
when idiosyncratic risk, substitutability of goods, and prediction ability are large.
In addition, it is shown that expansionary fiscal policy discourages investment in
prediction ability in the short run, but does not affect it in the long run.
Two remarks on this paper are required. First, my analysis is not valid either
when crowding out does not occur or when aggregate shocks are more important than
idiosyncratic shocks. If there is no crowding out, there is no trade off between private
consumption and government expenditure. Therefore, there is no trade off between
entrepreneurship and central planning.
If aggregate shocks are more important than idiosyncratic shocks, then it would
not be difficult for government to access information7. The comparison between
aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks reminds us that Hayek (1945) compares
the relative importance of different kinds of knowledge - scientific knowledge and the
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. This paper implies
7Bénassy (2001) shows that the optimal fiscal policy is activist even if government is less informed
about aggregate shocks.
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that the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy may depend on the answers to
the questions raised by Hayek (1945). Note that, as mentioned in the Introduction,
recent micro evidence emphasizes the importance of unobserved idiosyncratic factors
explaining the redistribution of workers. It suggests that a quantitative examination
of the model would be fruitful8. Although I have chosen to work with a static
model to clarify the main intuition in this paper, for the quantitative exercise, the
model should be extended to a standard dynamic model in order to incorporate
the effects of intertemporal substitution, capital accumulation, and government-debt
accumulation. This extension is the next interesting challenge.
Second, the model in this paper aimed to examine the effect of expansionary fiscal
policy on real GDP, but did not attempt to examine the optimal size of government
expenditure. In this sense, the result of this paper cannot be judged from a norma-
tive point of view. The log linear specification of my utility function allows us to
ignore how the relative price between C and G goods influences the demand for C
goods. This assumption assists in clarifying the intuition of my analysis by elimi-
nating auxiliary effects. However, the same assumption requires that I ignore how
the relative price affects the optimal size of government expenditure. As the effect
of entrepreneurship is summarized by the price index, the assumptions are fairly re-
strictive for examining the optimal size of government expenditure. This is an issue
that needs to be analyzed separately. That task is also left for future research.
8Of course, these exercises might underestimate the role of entrepreneurship that is emphasized by
Kirzner (1997), as a statistical distribution can only measure Knightian risk faced by entrepreneurs.
Nonetheless, I believe that the quantitative exercise can at least provide a lower bound about the
effect of entrepreneurship.
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